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What's Your Advice, Counsel?
From Distinction to Detention,
Financial Support to Ground
Support, and Everything in
Between
INTRODUCTION
The following is an informal summary of the discussions that
took place in the Workshop Session of the 2nd IDF International
Conference on the Law of Armed Conflict, held April 25-27, 2017. In
this session, conference participants were given practical scenarios on
a range of issues for consideration.1 In adherence with the Chatham
House Rule, the summary is presented without reference to the identity
or affiliation of the participants.2
SCENARIO 1: QUESTIONING AND DETENTION
State A (the State) is engaged in an armed conflict with
an organized armed group (the OAG) outside the borders of
State A. During this operation, the State ground forces are
required to maneuver in the outskirts of the village
"Valhalla." According to intelligence reports, both civilians
and OAG fighters are likely to be present in the village when
State forces pass through; the OAG fighters in the village are
in fortified positions, well concealed amongst civilian objects
(OAG positions). State intelligence is unable to provide the
precise locations of these positions; however, it is reasonably
certain that they are located within the "Kia" neighborhood
and in the southern and western outskirts of Valhalla.
1. Over 120 participants attended the conference, including pratitioners and
academics from the following countries and organizations: Australia, Bulgaria,
Canada, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Israel, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdon, the
United States of America, Spain, South Korea, Switzerland, Turkey, NATO and the
ICRC. For this session, participants were divided into groups of approximately 20
people per group, each group consisting of both academics and practitioners and
comprising of wide geographic and organizational diversity,
2. The discussions have been edited for this publication (for example, where the
same scenario was discussed by more than one group, the discussions have been
combined into one summary).
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The ground forces maneuver towards the outskirts of the
village. Despite the State's efforts in warning the civilian
population to vacate the area (including dropping leaflets),
intelligence reports assess that approximately 20 percent of
the civilian population has remained in Valhalla.
In light of this, the commanding officer (CO) of the
ground forces decides to change his maneuvering route
towards the eastern side of Valhalla. Consequently, the CO
wants to order his forces to stop and question every male who
appears to be aged 16-50, so as to inquire if any of them are
affiliated with the OAG, as well as to gather intelligence on
the OAG positions.
Question 1: What legal advice do you give to the CO regarding
this order? Would your advice change if such questioning would
require holding the persons for a number of hours in order to properly
question them? Would your advice change if the questioning was to
inquire to where the civilian population has evacuated?
The discussion considered the legal basis and legal threshold for
the deprivation of liberty of persons in an armed conflict, and
whether there is a distinction between an international armed
conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in this
regard.
There was broad agreement hat it would be lawful for the CO to
order his forces to stop and question every male who appears to be
aged 16-50 and that such questioning should be limited to the
shortest period of time possible in the circumstances. No precise
period of time was specified, with the acknowledgement hat strict
predetermined timeframes cannot accommodate the different
circumstances of each specific case.
There were various suggestions as to the legal basis for such
action, some of which were said to also express a standard for
carrying out detention during hostilities. These included a
commander's inherent authority to detain persons during hostilities;
the existence of a military necessity; this not being a case of arbitrary
detention; and the ability to take necessary security measures
pursuant to Article 27 of the Geneva Convention (GC) IV (in the case
that the operation was taking place as part of an IAC in which the
treaty would apply). One participant also mentioned in this regard
the need to clarify the status of suspected persons in the context of
Article 5 of GC III (also applicable only in IACs).
One participant added that the fact that the civilian population
in the area had already been warned and had been asked to leave
raises a general suspicion about the remaining persons in a way that
justifies their questioning.
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The participants were not concerned about the fact that the
questioning was solely for the purpose of intelligence gathering, so
long as it was limited to the shortest period of time possible in the
circumstances. At the same time, they agreed that the persons
questioned are not obliged to answer the questions they are asked
and that they must not be tortured.
One of the participants, who maintained that that there is an
inherent authority to detain persons during hostilities, recalled the
contemporary legal dispute regarding the existence of such authority
in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), in case the scenario
indeed described an NIAC. This participant, however, argued that it
is doubtful that the actions described in the scenario amount to
"detention." Another participant suggested that the scenario involved
"tactical questioning," short of "detention."
Question 2: During questioning of the aforementioned persons,
one of them admits that he is a member of the OAG. Consequently, the
possibility of long term internment is considered. What legal advice do
you give to the CO?
On this issue, the participants considered, more specifically, the
legal basis for long term interment in IAC and in NIAC.
Regarding an IAC, the participants agreed that there is no
difficulty in internment on the basis of one of the applicable legal
sources that address this issue, namely, GC IV, GC III, or Articles
33-34 of the Additional Protocol 1 (API) (for states party to AP1).
With respect to an NIAC, it was noted that internment is the
subject of a contemporary legal controversy. Two participants
maintained that it is permissible to intern a person on security
grounds until the end of hostilities, pursuant to a procedure of
periodic review. Another participant referred to the provisions in GC
IV regulating internment, suggesting that they may be applied to the
scenario by way of an analogy. No participants suggested that the
action in the scenario is altogether prohibited.
Question 3a: During questioning of one of the civilians, Roth, it
emerges that he himself has not taken part in any of the OAG's
activities, however his relative, who is a member of the OAG, has
revealed to him the locations of OAG positions. The CO wants to
transfer Roth to a command and control center, located on the border
of State A, so that he may indicate to intelligence officers on a map the
locations of the OAG positions. What legal advice do you give to the
CO?
Question 3b: The CO wants Roth to accompany the forces and
point out the locations of the OAG positions. What legal advice do you
give to the CO?
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Discussion on this issue highlighted the question whether
intelligence gathering is a lawful reason for temporarily holding
civilians, and what limits may exist therein, particularly with regard
to what the person is being asked to do or provide.
The participants did not consider the questioning of a civilian for
intelligence-gathering purposes to present a difficulty as a matter of
principle. Consequently, most of the discussion focused on possible
situations where Roth is being coerced and/or put into risk while
accompanying the soldiers and pointing out OAG positions, and
whether this would affect the legality of the actions.
With regard to coercion, some participants raised the factual
question of whether Roth is being coerced or rather agrees (or at least
does not object) to accompanying the soldiers. One participant opined
that physical resistance is where the line should be drawn, but others
refrained from determining at what point the force's action would
amount to illegitimate coercion.
With regard to risk, one participant indicated that there is no
difficulty in principle with the fact that Roth is being held by troops,
even though they are legitimate military objectives and thus prone to
attack, seeing as sending Roth to the command and control center
would also mean that he would be held by troops there. One
participant assumed that taking Roth to the battlefield would itself
put him at an undue risk and therefore cannot be done. Another
participant noted that the fact Roth is assisting the force might even
make him a direct participant in hostilities and thus prone to attack,
but that international law does not prohibit such a result. No agreed-
upon conclusions were reached in this regard.
SCENARIO 2: ORGANIZED ARMED GROUPS
The Intelligence Corps of State A (the State) is in the
process of gathering information regarding an organization
belonging to non-state actor B (the Organization). You, as the
State's military legal officer, are presented with an
intelligence report on the Organization, including its
organizational structure.
The intelligence report explains that the Organization is
comprised of two branches. The first can be easily defined as
a military branch (or the First Branch). It is solely dedicated
to military activities, its structure is hierarchical, and it is
comprised of a superior military council in charge of regional
commanders who themselves are responsible for several
combat units.
The second branch is responsible for managing many
civilian affairs, including: economic activity, welfare,
education, and culture (the Second Branch). In addition, this
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branch also manages some military affairs (additional detail
below). It is also hierarchical and is comprised of executive
commissions, staff headquarters, and the culture and
education agency. The activities of these bodies are as
follows:
Executive Commissions: Operating under the control of
the Second Branch are three commissions, each responsible
for all civilian activities in their "jurisdiction" and, also, for
commanding and operationalizing independent military units
in addition to those of the First Branch. Besides directly
commanding these units during active hostilities, the
commissions are also responsible for enlisting fighters as well
as administrative maintenance. These combat units' primary
objective is to prevent the advance of enemy forces in the
region and they account for approximately 30 percent of the
Organization's fighting force.
Staff Headquarters: These headquarters are made up of
three departments: human resources, finances, and
infrastructure. Accordingly, the staff headquarters is
responsible for general management of human resources in
the Second Branch, including the combat units under the
responsibility of the executive commissions. Furthermore,
throughout hostilities they are expected to issue situational
reports regarding combatant casualties to the leadership of
the Organization. In addition, the staff headquarters are
responsible for acquiring and developing infrastructures and
real estate for the First Branch, including infrastructure and
real estate for the use of the combat units under the control of
the Executive Commissions. Likewise, they are also in charge
of the general budgeting of the Organization as well as
managing the specific assets of the First Branch.
The Culture and Education Agency: This agency
organizes cultural events mainly focused on celebrating the
Organization's ideology. In addition, the agency runs
educational programs for the local population in the area in
which the Organization operates.
Question 1: In light of the intelligence report, does the
Organization, or any part of it, constitute an OAG? If so, which part?
The discussion around this question centered around the issue of
what legal criteria exist for determining whether an entity belonging
to a party to a conflict is an "OAG," and whether parts of an entity
that maintains both military and civilian functions can be included in
such an "OAG."
A few participants suggested that the Organization should be
considered as a whole, regardless of the specific functions carried out
2018] 983
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by its different parts. These participants maintained that all
members of the Organization are members of an OAG.
Other participants argued that only those branches of the
organization that maintain fighting functions (that is, are charged
with conducting hostilities) are to be considered part of an OAG. This
included the Executive Commissions, which maintain fighting
functions as well as other functions. In support of this position, one
participant likened the Organization to standing militaries common
in developed states, which contain combat, combat support, and
combat-service support units. A majority of the participants-
utilizing this analogy-maintained that the Staff Headquarters were
also part of an OAG (as in a state-run standing military, persons with
similar functions-such as servicing, supporting, or managing
resources for combat activities-could be targeted). The majority of
participants were of the opinion that in light of the facts presented in
the scenario, the Culture and Education Agency would not be
considered part of an OAG.
Question 2: With regard to those entities defined as OAGs: What
are the criteria for determining that a person is a member of the OAG?
Does membership in the OAG make one targetable (and if not, which
specific members would be targetable)?
It was suggested that membership in an OAG is determined by
being part of the organizational structure-being subject to
"command and control" is key, while mere "association" would not be
sufficient. A determination that a person is part of the OAG's
organizational structure is sufficient for defining membership.
In terms of targeting, the majority of the participants stated that
once membership in an OAG is determined, those persons become
targetable. For example, a person who provides combat support, or
routine services, in a manner subject or subordinate to the OAG's
command structure, would be targetable. The majority objected to
using continuous combat function (CCF) as a criterion.
Two participants maintained that CCF is a necessary
requirement for determining a person targetable. Under this view, a
formal member of an OAG who does not maintain a CCF would not be
considered targetable.
One participant, while rejecting the CCF requirement, did argue
that there are additional requirements beyond mere membership,
such as providing combat or combat support services (such as those
reporting on casualties or acquiring infrastructure). In this regard, it
was suggested that "combat support services" is a status ascribed to
personnel irrespective of whether they fulfil their function or not, and
thus personnel providing combat support services would be targetable
irrespective of whether their specific activities are actually carried
out.
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Thus, the majority of participants were of the opinion that all
members of the Organization (except for those belonging to the
Culture and Education Agency, which under the extant
circumstances would not be considered part of the OAG) would be
targetable.
Question 3: You are now presented with information concerning a
highly qualified engineer, who possesses vital knowhow relating to
weapons systems (the Engineer) and has been hired by the First
Branch in order to head a vital weapons program. Can the Engineer
can be targeted, and on what basis?
The primary issue that arose here was whether persons who are
not formally members of the OAG can be considered "functional"
members on account of their activities. If they could not be considered
as such, it was discussed whether there was sufficient information to
determine the persons to be targetable on the basis of them being, at
the time, civilians directly participating in hostilities.
Most of the participants were of the opinion that the Engineer
could not be considered a member of the OAG (specifically, the First
Branch). One participant argued this by highlighting that the
Engineer was hired externally by the Organization and did not seem
to be subject to the command and control of the Organization. This
participant suggested that as a result the Engineer is more analogous
to civilian staff than to military personnel.
Another participant countered that it is the actual services
rendered by the Engineer that are relevant, and not the mode of
engagement of the Engineer (hired or otherwise). In this case, the
participant argued that the type of services provided make the
Engineer targetable.
Another participant argued that although they do not see the
Engineer as a member of the OAG, the Engineer would still be
targetable if he were considered to be directly participating in
hostilities. With the facts at hand, however, the Engineer appears to
be too remote to be considered a direct participant in hostilities.
SCENARIO 3: "FINANCIAL FACILITIES" AND FINANCIERS
During an aerial campaign waged by State B (the State)
against an organized 'armed group (the OAG), state
intelligence indicates that striking the financial facilities of
the OAG would significantly impair the OAG's military
capacities, as these financial facilities fund the acquisition of
weapons and pay for fighters' wages.
In particular, the OAG maintains cash storage facilities,
from which cash is drawn to directly finance the OAG's
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activities. Seventy percent of the money is used to finance
strictly operational activities, while the remaining 30 percent
is used to finance other activities.
In addition, the OAG manages facilities that mine and
store tin. The OAG trades this tin in order to finance its
military activities; it also uses this tin to construct military
structures and to manufacture means of warfare.
Question 1: In light of recent developments relating to the
targeting of financial depots and other so-called war-sustaining
targets, would you say that State forces are permitted to target the
cash storage facilities of the OAG and the tin mining facilities?
This scenario raised the more general question of what defines a
military objective, and whether objects such as money and related
objects would fall within the definition, and in what circumstances if
so.
All participants agreed that a determination regarding the cash
storage would depend on the nexus to the military activities. A
number of participants agreed that while the use of additional
terminology helps to understand the meaning of "effective
contributions to military action," it is important to assess each object
on its merits and not pigeonhole contributions into categories with
automatic assessments, such as "war-sustaining."
In the case at hand, the large majority of participants argued
that as the purpose of most of the funds is to finance operational
activities, those funds would be a military objective. One participant
argued that lacking any further information about the 30 percent of
the funds beyond it being marked for "other activities" and
specifically indicating that it is intended for civilian use, they would
view the entirety of the funds as a military objective. One participant
argued that there does not seem to be enough of a direct link between
any of the funds and military activities to declare the funds a military
objective.
The participants then discussed whether the attack would
conform to the principle of proportionality. One participant argued
that a proportionality assessment would only be required if the
targeting of these funds would have a close connection with harm to
civilians or civilian objects. The fact that targeting financial facilities
may have some adverse effect on the lives of civilians is not relevant,
whereas the value of the target (i.e., the 70 percent of funds used to
finance operational activities) is relevant.
The majority of participants were of the opinion that the tin
mining facilities are likely to be targetable (either due to the fact that
they are used to finance military activities or because the materials
are used for weaponry), but many argued that additional information
was required in order to make a final assessment.
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Question 2: You are presented with information on a major donor
to the OAG (the Arms Donor), who has requested that all her
donations be used for the acquisition of arms. The Arms Donor
contributes roughly USD 2 million to the OAG each year. Can she be
targeted?
Most of the discussion focused on whether persons may, by virtue
of their activities, be identified as "members" of OAGs, and if so,
under what circumstances.
Assuming that in this case it is not known that the Arms Donor
is an official member of the OAG, most participants argued that the
mere contribution of funds would not on its own be considered an
activity that indicates membership in the OAG.
However, in a case where a person is known or assessed to hold
significant influence over the OAG by virtue of their financing
activities .(including by directing the use of funds for military
activities), a number of participants agreed that such a person would
be considered a "member" of the OAG.
It was also suggested that the concept of "civilians directly
participating in hostilities" could be relevant to this scenario, but this
was not expanded upon.
Question 3: You receive intelligence that the Arms Donor has
made another cash donation to the OAG, but this time you do not
know of a specific request that the funds be used for arms acquisition.
Can the cash donation itself be targeted?
Some participants concluded that once the cash is in the hands of
the OAG, it is targetable. This is because an OAG is akin to a state
military in that 100 percent of its funds can be assumed to be used for
military purposes; accordingly, unless there is information pointing to
the contrary, they would consider all the cash to be a military
objective. There was also a suggestion that the cash may be
targetable while it is being transported to the OAG. Other partici-
pants said there is insufficient information to determine the cash a
"military objective."
SCENARIO 4: GROUND MANEUVERS IN URBAN AREAS
It is the second week of the armed conflict between State
A (the State), and OAG B (the OAG), which is taking place
outside the borders of State A. Ground forces belonging to the
State are beginning their ground maneuver, sending a
Brigade into a specific urban area controlled by fighters
belonging to the OAG. The Brigade must move through a
certain route in the area in order to complete its mission and
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accomplish its operational objective. There are no alternative
routes the forces can take.
According to intelligence briefings, the OAG has set up an
ambush in this area effectively rendering the maneuvering
path a death-trap. The exact location of the OAG's ambushing
forces is unknown, but it is known that they are well-
prepared and well-equipped. Several specific buildings are
known to be military objectives, and additional (unidentified)
buildings are strongly believed to be used by the OAG for
military purposes. Intelligence briefings further state that all
civilians have evacuated the area.
Question 1: As the Brigade plans its entry into the enemy-held
area, it requests close air support with the intention of neutralizing the
OAG's forces and preventing them from carrying out their operational
plans. Specifically, the Brigade commander plans that fighter jets and
gunships strike all eight buildings overlooking the maneuvering path.
Three of these buildings have been identified as military objectives;
there is no specific information regarding the remaining five buildings
other than the general information about the ambush. The Brigade
commander asks for your legal advice regarding the lawfulness of her
plan.
The discussion centered around what constitutes a "military
objective," and what level of certainty is required regarding a specific
object in order to be designated as such.
The positions in this regard were divided almost equally amongst
the group. One view was that in light of the information regarding
the ambush and the use of at least some of the buildings for military
purposes, all eight buildings could be targeted. Several arguments
were suggested in support of this position. As the purpose of the
mission is to control the area, and it seems that the area is devoid of
civilian presence, a few participants argued that the entire area (in
which the OAG is operating to carry out the ambush) could be
considered a military objective and thus the structures could be
targeted. Others noted that where the buildings are interconnected
(for example, by linking tunnels), all the buildings can be treated as a
single compound and a single military objective. It was also suggested
that an analogy could be drawn between hilltops and buildings that
could be used for ambush positions, and thus the buildings could be
considered military objectives by "location." Finally, it was suggested
that in light of the specific and general intelligence information noted
above, it was probable that all buildings were being used for military
purposes and thus constitute military objectives.
On the other hand, there was a view that there was insufficient
information to designate the five buildings as military objectives, and
that a positive designation could only be made where there was more
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specific information indicating which buildings were used for military
purposes. It was also suggested that the intelligence regarding the
impending ambush would not, on its own, justify targeting those five
buildings merely to reduce the risk to the maneuvering forces.
Question 2: The Brigade is now inside the area and engaged in
door-to-door combat. Halfway through clearing the area, the Brigade
is sustaining heavy fire and is pinned down. The forces have several
casualties and wounded soldiers. The exact position of the enemy is
still unknown. Can artillery be used in order to disrupt or suppress
attacking fire? Is the answer dependent on certain circumstances
(availability of alternative means, military significance of taking the
specific area, etc.)? Would your assessment change if intelligence
assessed there were still twenty civilians present in the area who could
be potentially harmed as a result of using artillery?
Participants considered the legality of using artillery in urban
areas to disrupt or suppress attacking fire. All participants agreed
that the use of artillery in this manner is lawful, with some
participants noting the operational benefits that artillery provides,
such as speed, availability, and coverage. As with all uses of means of
warfare, the forces are obligated to employ the means that will likely
result in less collateral damage while allowing the same military
advantage.
In this particular case, some participants felt that while no
questions regarding the principle of distinction arose, additional
information was required in order to make a determination as to
whether the duty to take precautions had been fulfilled. Thus for
example, participants said that more information was needed
regarding the availability and efficacy of alternative means that may
have resulted in lesser harm. In this regard, it was noted that
artillery may actually be less destructive than other means (such as
airstrikes) even in an urban environment.
With regard to the presence of civilians, most participants did
not believe this changed the legality of the use of artillery per se, but
stressed that it would impact the need to assess alternative means
and other steps to minimize collateral damage.
SCENARIO 5: TARGETING
It is the first week of an armed conflict between State A
(the State) and OAG B (the OAG). The Division Commander is
holding his hourly meeting to review new intelligence and
operational information concerning potential targets. Seated
at the table is the intelligence officer, the operations officer,
the civilian affairs officer, and you, the legal adviser.
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Newly received intelligence indicates a certain house, so
far believed to be a civilian object, is in fact a shelter for the
enemy's most senior military commander, Pierre Smith.
According to the intelligence officer, a normally reliable
source has indicated that the enemy commander is present in
the building, but the information could be neither verified
nor refuted. The target is time sensitive, on account of the
enemy commander frequently changing his location. The
intelligence officer assesses that they will not be able to locate
the commander again once he moves locations. No collateral
damage is expected from an attack on the commander.
Question 1: What legal advice do you give to the commander?
Question 2a: Would your answer change if, after additional
intelligence is received, the intelligence officer now assesses there is a
50-50 chance that the building is Pierre Smith's shelter and that he is
currently present in. it?
Question 2b: Would your answer to the previous question change
if, after additional intelligence is received, the intelligence officer now
assesses that Pierre Smith is not in the building but that there is a 50-
50 chance that another military target of lesser value is present?
[Editor's note-This question was not included in the original
questions, but it was raised by one moderator at the beginning of the
discussion in their group.]
Question 3: Would your answers to the previous questions change
if ten civilians are expected to be killed as a result of the attack?
The discussions around this scenario concerned the level of
certainty required for identifying a lawful military objective.
Participants discussed whether the required level of certainty
depends on the value of the target and/or the expected collateral
damage from the attack. Participants also discussed the role that the
"rule of doubt" plays in determining military objectives.
In one of the groups, an anonymous questionnaire was conducted
at the beginning of the session to assess the approach of the
participants to these questions. The questionnaire asked participants
to determine whether the person would be targetable under the
principle of distinction (and not whether the attack would be lawful
under the principle of proportionality). The findings are extracted in
the table below. (Figures represent participants' votes on whether the
objects are targetable or not targetable.)
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Reliable Assessment Reliable
indication that there is a indication that
that Smith is 50% chance Smith is not






No civilian 10 - targetable 9 - targetable 6 - targetable
casualties 1 - not 2 - not
expected targetable targetable 4
Ten
cin 6 - targetable 6 - targetable
civilian 3-not0 - targetable
casualties targetable targetable 9 - not targetable
Lexpected I
As reflected by these results, in the ensuing discussion
participants were generally of the opinion that higher value targets
do not require a high level of certainty. With regard to a lesser value
target, participants were generally of the view that a lower level of
certainty was insufficient. When assessed that civilian casualties
could be expected from an attack, a higher level of certainty was
argued for both with regard to higher value targets and lower value
targets-although the level of certainty was still impacted by the
value of the intended target.
Question 4: The intelligence officer presents the following
information: A chain of beauty salons owned by the OAG is closed
during the hostilities. No employees show up for work, all customers
have been notified of the closure, and intelligence assessments indicate
the salons themselves are empty. Nevertheless, occasional and
temporary entries by unidentified males have been observed.
Specifically, it has been noticed that each time one of these males
enters a beauty salon (during the hostilities), a rocket is launched from
the salon's yard almost immediately. These rockets are aimed at the
State's military and civilian infrastructure. What legal advice do you
give the commander about possible attacks on persons entering or
leaving a beauty salon? What legal advice do you give about possible
attacks on any of the beauty salons owned by the OAG?
Participants agreed that the issue raised by this question
concerns the principle of distinction. They also discussed whether the
"pattern" identified by the intelligence officers would be sufficient for
targeting persons who have entered a salon or persons who have left
immediately after a rocket was launched, and whether the "pattern"
20187 991
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would allow for a determination that all such beauty salons as
military objectives.
There was consensus among the group that there are no legal
barriers to authorizing attacks based on behavior pattern analysis.
Some of the participants were of the opinion that the facts in the
scenario supported the position that anyone entering a beauty salon
constitutes a lawful target. As one participant noted, if the
intelligence officers are confident that a rocket will be launched
whenever a person enters one of the salons, then it may be reasonably
deduced that anyone entering a salon is targetable, and an attack
may be carried out even prior to a launch. Other participants
maintained that more information was needed in order to authorize
an attack, emphasizing that the scenario was not clear as to the level
of certainty with respect to the persons entering such salons.
The majority of participants were of the opinion that all the
beauty salons owned by the OAG may be designated as military
objectives, due to the pattern identified. One participant took a
slightly more limited view, arguing that not all beauty salons can
immediately be designated as military objectives. However, with the
understanding that the salons are closed during the hostilities, and in
the presence of evidence that when a person enters one of the beauty
salons a rocket is launched, a beauty salon becomes a military
objective the moment a person enters.
SCENARIO 6: PROPORTIONALITY
State A and State B are engaged in an armed conflict.
State A intends to strike rocket launcher positions, located
within a populated village of State B. Intelligence indicates
that these rockets are aimed towards a city center in State A
that does not contain any military targets. State A would like
to strike these positions in order to defend its civilians and
civilian infrastructure.
A collateral damage assessment carried out prior to the
attack has indicated that five civilian casualties are expected
from the strike. In addition, fuel-powered generators, which
supply power to a few civilian homes in the village and are
situated near the rocket launcher positions, are likely to be
damaged. Intelligence assessments raise the possibility that a
nearby hospital will also be affected by the attack. While the
hospital normally relies on the fuel-powered generators, it
also has its own backup generators in case of emergency. It is
unclear, however, whether these backup generators will
satisfy the hospital's needs-and for how long.
The commander responsible for authorizing the strike
asks for your legal advice.
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Question 1: What should the commander consider when assessing
the military advantage anticipated from the strike?
Participants discussed what constitutes "military advantage,"
particularly whether destroying or neutralizing military assets aimed
towards civilians or civilian sites can be considered a military
advantage.
There was consensus that the rocket launcher position
constituted a military objective, as rocket launchers by their very
nature contribute towards military action, and attacking them would
provide a definite military advantage, irrespective of the fact that the
rockets are pointed towards a civilian area.
The degree of this advantage was then discussed with regard to
the fact that the launcher is pointing at a civilian area. Most
participants were of the opinion that removing the threat from the
civilian population should be factored into the proportionality
analysis as part of the military advantage to be gained.
One participant drew a distinction between removing a concrete
and specific threat towards civilians and civilian objects as a military
advantage, and generally protecting civilians. Following on from this,
another participant suggested that the general protection of civilians
could be a reason for exercising force (us ad bellum), but was not
sure whether it could be a factor in jus in bello considerations. Both
participants agreed, however, that in the scenario at hand, attacking
the rocket launchers to remove the threat they posed could be
considered a concrete and direct military advantage in a
proportionality analysis.
A minority opinion was that the protection of civilians does not
provide a military advantage, but it could be considered in the context
of a self-defense analysis Gus ad bellum).
Question 2: What should the commander consider when assessing
the collateral damage expected from the strike?
Participants discussed which of the expected and possible effects
described in the scenario should be considered as part of the collateral
damage assessment.
There was consensus that expected death or injury to civilians,
or damage to civilian property, should be taken into account in the
proportionality analysis. With regards to the scenario, all
participants agreed that the commander should consider the expected
death of the five civilians and any expected damage to surrounding
civilian property (including the generators). In this context, it was
noted that a distinction needs to be drawn between the physical
damage to the generators, which should be taken into account as
damage to civilian objects, and the effect that such damage may have
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on the continued ability of the relevant homes to have access to
power, which should not.
During the discussion, it was also noted that the specific
character of the particular civilians expected to be harmed is not a
legal consideration in the proportionality analysis. As such, it would
not have an impact on the analysis if the civilians were women,
children, or men. However, it was noted that in practice, such factors
may have an influence on policy or ethical considerations that
commanders may take into account.
With regards to the possible impact on the hospital's services,
almost all participants were of the opinion that this should not be a
factor in the proportionality analysis. The reasoning for this position
was that the impact was "possible," and not "expected." Some
participants also noted that the effect on the functioning of the
hospital, even if expected and not only a possibility, was too removed
from the attack to be relevant to the proportionality analysis.
Question 3: State A is considering striking another military
objective--a command and control center in the same village. The
target is located in a two-story house, and there is no information
available regarding the number of civilians that reside in the house.
However, it is known that generally five to ten civilians reside in
similar residential buildings in the same area. It is also known that
50 percent of the locals have evacuated the village as a whole. No
information regarding the expected civilian casualties as a result of
striking this particular command and control center is available, all
feasible precautions have been taken, and an effective advance
warning has already been issued. The commander charged with
authorizing the strike is asking for your legal advice. What should the
commander consider when assessing the collateral damage expected
from the strike?
During the discussion, participants considered whether one could
rely on general information indicating the collateral damage expected
in order to assess proportionality, where specific information was
unavailable.
All participants agreed that in the absence of additional
information and after making efforts to exhaust all potential
intelligence, one may rely on the best available information-
including general information based on statistical or intelligence-
based analyses.
One opinion, which received support from other participants,
was that the commander must consider the worst-case scenario, while
taking into consideration the information concerning the evacuation
of the village. Thus, in accordance with this view, the commander in
the current scenario would start with the assumption that ten
civilians are usually present, and then factor in the 50 percent
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